Amid a rise in disputes with sports regulators, the UK government’s proposal to introduce an Independent Football Regulator opens the door to potentially novel competition law challenges.
The Football Governance Bill may become law by summer 2025. This article considers the role of the Regulator and assesses where potential disputes might arise.
Background: The Independent Football Regulator
The Football Governance Bill passed its final stage in the House of Lords on 26 March 2025 and, at the time of writing, awaits its second reading in the House of Commons.
The Bill aims to establish an Independent Football Regulator (“IFR“) to oversee elite men’s football in England. The IFR’s primary objectives are to ensure the: (i) financial sustainability of regulated clubs; (ii) financial resilience of English football; and (iii) heritage of English football.
Key provisions in the Bill include:
Disputes likely to arise as a result of the introduction of the IFR
The introduction of the IFR marks a significant change in the regulation of the English game, bringing new obligations and strategic considerations.
Who is in charge?
There remains considerable uncertainty as to how the IFR will work alongside the existing legal and regulatory framework.
Last year, UEFA was reported to have warned the UK Government that the English men’s team could be banned from Euro 2028 if the UK proceeded with its IFR plans. Whilst there is precedent for regulation in football (for example the French “Direction Nationale du Contrôle de Gestion” which has operated successfully in tandem with the Fédération Française de Football for many years), the existing governing bodies have form when it comes to stopping what they deem inappropriate political interference – for example, in 2006 Greece was briefly suspended from international football after its government passed legislation interfering with the autonomy of the Greek Football Federation (violating UEFA and FIFA regulations).
A key area of focus will be how the IFR’s financial regulations interact with the governing bodies’ existing rules (e.g. UEFA financial sustainability rules (FFP) and Premier League profit and sustainability rules (PSR)) given recent legal challenges in this space, as Premier League clubs (e.g. Nottingham Forest) have looked to appeal decisions given the costly consequences (points deductions and/or fines). The outcome of the Premier League’s case against Manchester City is hotly anticipated, and could have huge ramifications (in particular, the potential for a wave of “follow on” claims, as clubs argue they were adversely affected by the alleged conduct). The IFR’s planned introduction of further financial regulation could create more uncertainty and litigation risk for clubs (and governing bodies) unless the interrelationship between the IFR’s remit and existing financial regulations is clarified.
Competition law challenges?
The introduction of the IFR opens the door for further competition challenges, following a plethora of recent judgments which have profoundly impacted on the regulation of professional sports. Most notably, on 21 December 2023, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU“) delivered three landmark judgments: European Super League, International Skating Union, and Royal Antwerp.[1]
Key recent competition law challenges
European Super League [2]
In European Super League (“ESL”), a breakaway tournament proposed by twelve major European football clubs was strongly opposed by UEFA and FIFA, who threatened participating clubs and players with sanctions, arguing that international matches in Europe require their prior authorisation.
The CJEU ruled that FIFA and UEFA’s prior approval rules and sanctions represented a breach of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), but acknowledged that the rules and sanctions were not, by themselves, an abuse of a dominant position as they could pursue legitimate aims “in the specific context of professional football”. However, without a framework of “transparent, objective, precise and non-discriminatory” substantive criteria and procedural rules, they were an abuse of a dominant position.
International Skating Union [3]
The CJEU gave a similar judgment in International Skating Union (“ISU”). This dispute concerned two professional speed skaters, prevented from participating in a privately organised competition after the ISU – the global governing body– threatened lifetime bans for athletes who competed in unauthorised events.
The European Commission – and subsequently the CJEU – found these rules anti-competitive. In breach of Article 101 TFEU, the ISU’s eligibility rules constituted a decision by an association of undertakings that had the effect of restricting competition. In breach of Article 102 TFEU, the ISU’s rules were an abuse of its dominant position in the market, as they excluded rival event organisers.
Royal Antwerp [4]
In Royal Antwerp, the CJEU considered the legality of the “home-grown player rule”. Under UEFA rules, clubs participating in interclub competitions were required to have a minimum of eight locally trained players. The CJEU found that, although the objective of promoting local talent was legitimate, the rules violated the freedom of movement for workers under Article 45 TFEU, likely to give rise to indirect discrimination at the expense of players from another Member State. The CJEU’s judgment acknowledged there could be a justification if these rules pursued a non-economic objective and the restrictions were inherent and necessary to the attainment of that objective and deferred to the court in Brussels to make that assessment.
The CJEU’s judgment in European Super League, in particular, marked a turning point in the intersection of sports governance and competition law, reinforcing the principle that even powerful sporting federations are bound by EU legal standards in a market context. This has been followed by the recent Manchester City v Premier League[5] case, where an arbitral tribunal found the Premier League’s Associate Party Transaction rules were anti-competitive and violated the UK Competition Act 1998.
These cases show the potential for clubs to argue that certain of the proposed IFR’s powers (and ensuing decisions) risk being anti-competitive. In particular, clubs will closely scrutinise IFR plans to implement:
Licensing and ownership controls may inadvertently create barriers to entry if they limit clubs’ ability to compete or disproportionately favour certain clubs by setting specific criteria.
‘Backstop powers’ risk being seen as governmental overreach and could distort market dynamics.
Preventing clubs from joining breakaway tournaments is reminiscent of the prior approval rules in ESL and ISU. The IFR should consider these cases, which noted that such rules are legitimate in principle but require a framework of substantive criteria in order to avoid being anti-competitive.
Financial support mechanisms could be scrutinised as state aid (prohibited under EU competition law) if they distort competition and affect trade between EU member states.
Recent case law suggests the IFR should be aware of the steps needed to avoid its decisions being challenged as anti-competitive. Not least, it will need to demonstrate strong, objective criteria when making determinations to limit the risk of challenge.
Conclusion
There remains uncertainty when it comes to aligning the new regulations within the legal frameworks of existing governing bodies. A lack of clarity around the “ultimate arbiter” on a particular issue could create complexity for those within the English game trying to navigate multiple levels of regulation (from the IFR, the Premier League, the FA, UEFA, FIFA etc). The issue of how to reconcile the tension between the IFR’s aims of safeguarding the English game and the authority of the existing governing bodies will be one to watch.
Clubs will also be mindful of this uncertainty and the increased regulatory scrutiny they will face from the IFR, in particular regarding their financial operations, ownership structures, and governance practices. They will need to take steps to prepare for the new regulatory landscape. Once the IFR is in place, clubs may be on the lookout for potential anti-competitive challenges where they feel unfairly disadvantaged by IFR rulings.
Further legal challenges are likely. Both clubs and existing governing bodies will want to ensure their respective positions within the game are adequately protected and will consider using the courts and other forms of dispute resolution mechanisms to achieve this.
Footnotes
[1] Although these cases relate to EU competition law, they remain highly relevant to the UK, whose competition regime remains largely consistent with the EU.
[2] European Superleague Company SL v Federation internationale de football association (FIFA) C-333/21.
[3] International Skating Union v European Commission C-124/21 P.
[4] Royal Antwerp Football Club Case C-680/21.
[5] Premier League v. Manchester City FC [2021] EWCA 1110.
