The ‘Shareholder Principle’: An outdated doctrine?

The so-called shareholder principle provides that a company cannot claim privilege as against its own shareholders, save in respect of documents that came into existence in contemplation of, or for the dominant purpose of, proceedings between the company and its shareholders. The principle is a creature of long-standing case law, but the recent judicial examination to which it has been subject – both in this jurisdiction and others – has revealed uncertainty as to its ambit and even called into question its applicability in view of the principle of a company’s separate legal personality.
In the first part of this article, we examine two key recent decisions. In the second, we consider the practical issues that both companies and shareholders are likely to face when encountering the shareholder principle in the context of litigation, for so long as the law remains in a state of flux.

Recent Case Law

The shareholder principle was recently considered at first instance in this jurisdiction by Michael Green J in Various Claimants v. G4S [2023] EWHC 2863 (Ch) (“G4S“). In the G4S proceedings, institutional investors (the claimants) brought claims under section 90A and Schedule 10A FSMA against G4S Ltd (formerly G4S plc), a security company that was previously listed on the London Stock Exchange and Nasdaq Copenhagen, alleging that certain published statements made by G4S were falsified by dishonest conduct.

Section 90 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“FSMA“) provides that any person who is responsible for listing particulars and prospectuses is liable to pay compensation to any person who has acquired securities to which the particulars apply and has suffered loss in respect of them as a result of any untrue or misleading statement in the particulars, or omission from the particulars of any matter required to be included.

Section 90A and Schedule 10A FSMA allow shareholders to bring actions against UK listed companies for including untrue or misleading information, or making dishonest omissions, in published information about listed securities.

The issue arose when a sub-set of the claimants applied, in the course of the proceedings, for an order providing that certain documents withheld and/or redacted by G4S on the grounds of privilege should be disclosed to them. The documents in question had been created at the time of the alleged dishonest conduct and before the litigation was contemplated. The applicants were three claimants who held their shares as registered shareholders and a larger group of claimants who were the ultimate beneficial owners of shares in G4S through the UK electronic settlement system, CREST.

The claimants relied heavily on the most recent statement of the shareholder principle in Sharp v Blank [2015] EWHC 2681 (Ch), where Christopher Nugee J analogised the principle to trustees taking advice as to the running of the trust, paid for out of trust assets, who cannot assert privilege against the trust beneficiaries who have indirectly also paid for the advice. G4S argued that the importance of privilege to the administration of justice and the “shaky foundation” of the principle (on the basis that it was developed before seminal authorities on the separation of the company and its shareholders) should together influence how far the principle should reach. Michael Green J expressed doubts about the justification for the principle, but on the basis that only an appellate Court could determine whether the principle should be abandoned, he adopted the starting point that privilege should be preserved unless there is a good reason why it should not be.

Michael Green J then had to consider whether the shareholder principle applied on the particular facts. He held that:
  • The shareholder principle applies to shareholders that held their shares as direct registered shareholders at the time the relevant documents came into existence.
  • The shareholder principle covers both types of legal professional privilege (legal advice privilege and litigation privilege), but not without prejudice privilege.
  • The principle does not apply in respect of non-registered shareholders. In the Judge’s view, the principle is a right that is “an incidence to the legal ownership of shares“, such that he could not say that the holders of a beneficial interest (i.e. the wider class of claimants who are entitled to bring claims under FSMA) are “automatically entitled” to access the company’s privileged documents.  
  • The three registered shareholders were also not entitled to access the privileged documents in question. This was on account of practical difficulties, including the implications for confidentiality arrangements at the trial (given that the application had been made at a very late stage in the proceedings) and complications caused by the claimants’ lawyers needing to compartmentalise documents for different pools of claimants, and even individual claimants.

Both the uncertainty of the terrain that shareholders and companies are having to tread, and the need for consideration of the principle at appellate level in England and Wales, are underscored by a decision of the Court of Appeal of Bermuda in Re Jardine Strategic Holdings Limited [2024] CA (Bda) 7 Civ. The issue in the underlying proceedings is whether minority shareholders are entitled to be paid fair value for their shares upon the amalgamation or merger of public companies, and the shareholder principle has arisen in the course of the litigation as an issue to be addressed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the first instance Court’s decision that the shareholder principle applied on the particular facts, finding – consistent with the G4S decision – that the shareholder must have been a shareholder of the company at the time when the documents in question were created in order to have a right to access them. However, in juxtaposition with Michael Green J’s reluctance to extend the principle beyond direct registered shareholders, the Bermuda Courts consider that the principle does not depend on a proprietary interest, but is instead based on the relationship between the company and shareholder which gives rise to a joint interest privilege. The Court of Appeal considered it “obvious” that this relationship between “a company and its shareholders was the same whether those shareholders were the beneficial owners of the shares, or whether they were held through nominees“.

a company and its shareholders was the same whether those shareholders were the beneficial owners of the shares, or whether they were held through nominees

The Court of Appeal

Practical Considerations for section 90A (and schedule 10A) FSMA Claims

Key contacts and authors

Rob Fell

Rob Fell

Partner, Dispute Resolution